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Corporate Ownership: Some International Evidence 
Abstract 
In this research we evaluate how corporate ownership around the world is defined and which 
variables, related to a firm’s characteristics and the countries’ infrastructures, influences this. We find 
that there are a small number of countries where firms present a lower percentage of block holdings. 
We find that firm’s size is the most important determinant of block holdings worldwide, although 
some variables related with the quality of enforcement also play a crucial role.   
JEL classification: G32; G38. 
Keywords: Corporate ownership; Law and finance. 
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1. Introduction 
A recent debate in finance is related with the discussion about which forces influence corporate ownership and corporate block 
holdings. Legal environment is a possible explanation. Common law-based countries, such as the US, offer higher shareholder 
protection, and consequently a larger blockholder is less necessary because the smaller ones are well protected (La Porta et al 
(1998)). But legal environment also influences national country infrastructures. Banking systems are typical in civil law-based 
countries, while capital market-based systems emerge from common law-based countries. Thus, we can expect a widely held 
ownership in common law-based countries, as in the UK or in the US, and less diffused ownership structures in civil law-based 
countries, as in Germany and in Japan, where there are more cross relationships between financial and non-financial firms. Also 
governance variables, for example, rule of law, regulatory quality, and absence of corruption, should influence corporate block 
holdings. Li et al (2006) show that in countries with weak macro governance characteristics, financial institutions tend to have a 
large stake, controlling the company, when they intend to be a large shareholder, as opposed to countries with strong macro 
governance characteristics, where financial institutions are usually a shareholder as a role of monitoring the management. In fact, 
they suggest that financial institutions act as a monitor in strong macro governance environment and as owner in countries with 
low protection rights in order to ensure that monitoring is effective.  
Prowse (1992), comparing the percentage of outstanding corporate equity held by various sectors in the US and Japan, 
reports a higher proportion of corporations in possession of common stock in Japan, namely financial institutions (commercial 
banks and insurance companies). Households, on the other hand, play an important role in the ownership of the US firms. 
According to Becht and Roell (1999) the degree of ownership concentration in Continental Europe is significantly larger than in 
the US and the UK. Faccio and Lang (2002), based on a sample of Western European firms, also show that ownership is not 
homogeneous. Their results reveal a large number of widely held firms in the UK and Ireland, in comparison to continental 
Europe. They also show that the smallest firms and the industrial firms are more family-owned than financial institutions, and in 
some countries the state plays a decisive role in the biggest firms. Claessens et al (2000), using a sample of 2,980 East Asian 
companies from 9 countries, show how firms from that region are largely family-owned (Japanese firms are an exception), as well 
as how corporate wealth is in the hands of a few families. La Porta et al (1998) also conclude, considering the three largest 
shareholders in the ten largest non-financial (privately owned) firms by country, that Fench civil law countries present the highest 
concentration of ownership. 
Corporate ownership is not only influenced by law, but by political economy also. Roe (2000), Pagano and Volpin (2001) 
and Aganin and Volpin (2001), for example, defend this point of view. Furthermore, ignoring the importance of political economy 
can sometimes produce biased conclusions. For example, following the Great Depression and the consequent collapse of Italian 
investment banks, plus the dawn of the Fascist regime, the influence of the government on industrial companies increased, and 
consequently an undeveloped capital market emerged, with low investor protection. This explains why in the post-war period the 
Italian companies were family-owned. A similar event occurred in Portugal. After the Revolution of 1974, banks and industrial 
firms were nationalised, the stock exchange closed, and many investors lost their investments. When the companies were 
privatised at the end of the 80’s some were returned to the old owners whereas others remained in the hands of the government, 
even after they went public.  
The main objective of our paper is to evaluate corporate ownership around the world and which forces influences it, that 
is, country infrastructures or firm´s variables.  
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 describes the variables and definitions, the methodology, and the data. 
Section 3.3 characterises the corporate ownership structure for a sample of 32 countries, namely their owners and the way the 
control is owned. Section 3.4 concludes. 
 
2. Data, Definitions of Variables, and Methodology 
2.1 Data 
This paper is based fundamentally on the information obtained from the Factset/Lionshares database, annual reports, books, and 
websites of firms that detail their ownership structures. Our data concerns the end of 2005, more precisely the period between 
December 2005 and March 2006, depending on the information supplied by firms. We selected the 20 largest firms by country, 
according to the results obtained from the Worldscope database (Worldscope item, WC08001), for the following countries: 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Malaysia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, the UK, and the US. Thus, we analyse the corporate ownership of 640 firms around the 
world. 
 
2.2. Definitions of Variables 
We have collected only blockholders that own more than 5% of voting rights of a firm. A firm whose blockholders own 
less than 20% of voting rights is considered widely held. These figures are in line with recent research, for example, Holderness 
(2005) and La Porta et al (1999) who chose 5%, 10%, and 20% respectively. The blockholder percentage of voting rights takes 
into account the American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) stakes. There are few examples of shareholders in possession of a 
qualified participation as a result of a simultaneous investment in common stocks and ADRs.  
We define the following block holders: Individual - when a given person (or a group of given people) is the sole shareholder 
who controls a significant percentage of voting rights, we define that firm as individually controlled.; Government - when a state 
has an important stake; Financial Institution - when a financial institution (or a group of firms related to asset management) is (are) 
the relevant block holder; Financial Vehicle - We define a financial vehicle as a firm that was created to control another one, for 
example, holding companies, or very specific cases of companies, such as foundations (very common in Denmark and Italy, for 
example), and firms that result from cooperatives or mutual objectives (for example, Rabobank is a Dutch cooperative banking 
institution with offices all over the world), and trustees (for example, Leverhulme trust, a British research and educational charity).  
 
2.3. Methodology 
We intend to observe the firms´ corporate block holdings from countries at several stages of economic development (developed 
and developing countries), with different sources of law (civil and common law-based), and with distinct financial systems 
(banking-based or capital market-based). 
The way we found to evaluate whether there is any influence of firm variables or country infrastructure variables on corporate 
block holdings is to control them. This will permit us not only to verify the similarities and differences across countries, but also to 
analyse which are the main determinants of corporate block holdings. Thus, we use the following firm-level variables: Size - 
Wealth constraints, in addition to risk aversion imply that a blockholder is less able to accomplish as a firm becomes larger, 
explain the negative relationship between firm size and the percentage of voting rights, ceteris paribus (Demsetz and Lehn (1985), 
Prowse (1992) and Holderness (2005)); Volatility - A firm with more volatile profit rate is more difficult to monitor and to control, 
and as a result the level of ownership concentration is expectably higher, in order to avoid eventual abuses by management 
(Demsetz and Lehn (1985)); Market-to-Book - This variable is seen as a proxy for the growth opportunities of a firm. We expect 
that a firm with more growth opportunities, and also with more doubts by investors, would develop easily in a developed capital 
market. Kahn and Winton (1998) show that the ownership retention by the initial shareholders will be lower, after an IPO, on 
firms characterised by growth opportunities with need of external finance.  
With regard to country-level variables the following are used: Legal Environment – We use legal country origin and anti-
director rights as measures of legal environment. We expect a positive relationship between diffuse corporate ownership structures 
and common law-based countries, particularly when the agency problem concerns management-shareholder (see La Porta et al 
(1999)). In line with prior assumption, we expect that the higher the investor protection rights are, the lower the possibility of 
expropriating wealth is from the smallest ones by management; Quality of Enforcement - In this research the level of corruption, 
measured by corruption perception index, an index produced by Transparency Internacional, and rule of law are the variables of 
quality of enforcement. Li et al (2006) using an enforcement index, whose components are  rule of law, regulatory quality, and 
absence of corruption, show that there is positive impact of such variable on ownership held by institutional blockholders; 
Corporate Disclosure – More diffused ownership structures in countries where accounting and financial disclosure present higher 
standards (see La Porta et al (1998)) is expected. Disclosure level is from Bhattacharya et al (2003) and the original source is the 
Center for International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR); Religion – We expect, in line with “The Protestant Ethic and 
the Spirit of Capitalism” of Weber (1904), more developed capital markets on non catholic countries, with common legal 
infrastructures,  and we expect a positive relationship between non Catholic religion, block holdings and the existence of ultimate 
owners; Economic, Stock Market, Banking, and Financial Institutional Environment - The opportunities in a developed capital 
market induce firms to issue equity; in this case, we expect a lower ownership concentration ratio for developed capital markets. 
We use the liquidity ratio as a proxy for capital market development. Liquidity ratio is taken from World Development Indicators 
and is defined as volume traded at a local stock exchange divided by the gross domestic product (GDP). Private credit is also used 
to evaluate if a banking system influence corporate ownership. Domestic credit provided by banking sector % of GDP, from 
World Bank, is the measure of private credit. The level of economic development measured by GDP per capita, taken from 
International Monetary Fund, will be used to evaluate if different economic conditions influence block holdings and the 
percentage of widely held firms. Finally, because there is a positive relationship between the size of mutual fund industry, a proxy 
for financial institutional development, and strong rules and laws (see Khorana et al (2005)), we test if the same occurs between 
diffused ownership and the level of development of financial institutions. Size of mutual fund industry is extracted from 
Investment Company Institute (ICI).  
 
3. Results 
Table 1 shows the block holdings of the twenty largest firms by country, considering 20% as threshold. We include all block 
holdings (qualified participations) that represent more than 5% of voting rights, and when the sum of qualified participations is 
lower than 20%, we then consider that a firm presents a free float of 100%. The twenty largest firms by country represent a 
significant percentage of local market capitalisation. In 26 countries the market capitalisation of the largest firms is higher than 
60% of local capital market. In fact, only Japan and the USA, the largest capital markets around the world, with thousands of 
firms, present a lower value. Even so, the largest firms are responsible for 19.8% and 25.5% respectively for local market 
capitalisation. Table 1 also presents the mean block holding of the twenty largest firms of each country. Results show that 
Australia, the UK, and the US are the capital markets whose largest firms present the highest percentage for free float. On the 
opposite extreme, emerge Chile, Indonesia, Portugal, and Turkey where the largest blockholders, on average, have more than 60% 
of total voting rights. The average block holding by country is 40%. It seems that, in general, corporate ownership around the 
world is highly concentrated in a restricted number of shareholders.   
Financial vehicles are the most represented blockholder for the largest firms around the world. On average, such 
blockholders have 15.5% of total voting rights. The weight of financial vehicles is particularly observed in Indonesia, Portugal, 
and Turkey. Financial institutions, individuals, and governments, on the other hand, present similar block holdings. However, 
while financial institutions have an important role in Singapore and South Africa, individuals play a decisive position in Chile and 
Switzerland, and the state in Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. In fact, these results show the importance of 
the political economy in many large firms of Asia. Moreover, Table 1 also shows, on the one hand, how different shareholder 
structures are around the world, and on the other hand, the arduousness to find the determinants of corporate ownership around the 
world. For example, Hong Kong and Malaysia are common law-based, shareholders are well protected, both of which are current 
developed capital markets, although the state seems to interfere in firms. On the other hand, in the presence of similar institutional 
environment, as in Australia, and the UK, financial institutions are the most important shareholders of the largest firms and the 
state seems to not interfere with private business.  
Table 2, panel A, reports summary statistics of country-level variables. The sample represents different country 
infrastructures because, in general, variables show a wide variation. For example, there are (i) 15 countries, where shareholders are 
protected (anti-director rights higher than 4), (ii) 12 common law-based countries, and (iii) 11 Catholic countries. This result 
explains why the sample has many capital market and banking-based countries (see, for example, Demirguk and Levine (1999)). 
Corruption level and rule of law, on the other hand, do not exhibit significant changes as other variables. Only 4 countries display 
a lower GDP per capita (< 10.000 dollars), as well as 3 with lower score for rule of law (< 3), which confirms that most of 
countries are developed economies. In fact, emerging capital markets are only represented by Chile, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand and Turkey. Concerning firm-level variables (Panel B) it must be stated 
that G-7 countries present the largest firms around the world. The median market capitalisation of the 20 largest firms of those 
countries exceeds 15 billion dollars. Firms from Chile, Indonesia, Ireland, New Zealand, Portugal, Thailand, and Turkey, in their 
turn, present a median market capitalisation inferior to 3 billion dollars, reflecting once more how heterogeneous the sample is. In 
relation to market-to-book it must be focused that the result obtained for the US, significantly higher than in most countries, 
illustrates the importance of the US capital market for firms with growth opportunities. Indonesia, South Korea, and Turkey, on 
the other hand, as emerging countries exhibit the highest volatility. 
In Table 3 there are many comparisons on the mean percentage of block holdings by country or firm level-variable, 
considering the largest twenty firms by country. Means are grouped according to definitions described in section 2, that is, legal 
environment, anti-director rights, corruption perception index, rule of law, disclosure level, religion, liquidity ratio, size of mutual 
fund industry, private credit, GDP per capita, market capitalisation, market-to-book, and volatility. The mean comparison is also 
made considering the following categories of blockholders: Financial institutions, individuals, financial vehicles, and government.  
Table 3 shows few situations where differences on mean between groups of countries are observed. For example, there is 
no difference in mean between groups of countries with high and low anti-director rights, independently of threshold, 
contradicting for example La Porta et al (1999). Considering the sum of block holdings, there are some criteria where we observe 
differences in mean between groups of countries, namely when they are concentrated by corruption perception index, rule of law, 
liquidity ratio, GDP per capita, market capitalisation, and market-to-book. In fact, in countries characterised by low levels of 
corruption, high rule of law, developed capital markets, high GDP per capita, large firms, and significant number of growth firms, 
it is possible to identify a significant number of firms with a highly disseminated shareholding structure. However, these 
relationships must be analysed with caution because all variables are correlated. The quality of enforcement, measured either by 
corruption perception index or rule of law, assures that the public authorities protect investors, creating the conditions for a 
developed capital market with millions of investors and firms whose shareholder structure is dispersed to emerge. Financial theory 
explains very well the importance of quality of enforcement for developing a capital market and how important a capital market is 
to create wealth (see for example La Porta et al (1997, 1998) and Levine and Zervos (1998)). On the other hand, there are some 
developed capital markets such as the US, the UK, and Japan where firms are comparatively larger, and the larger the firms of a 
country, the lower the ownership concentration they present. Wealth constraints and risk aversion can explain such a result (see 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Prowse (1992), and Holderness (2005)). Concerning market-to-book, financial literature identifies a 
positive relationship between capital market development and investment in growing companies (see for example Wurgler (2000) 
and Rajan and Zingales (1998)), for one hand, and the negative relationship between ownership concentration and growth firms, 
on the other hand (see for example Kahn and Winton (1998)).  
Table 3 also shows that the percentage of block holdings by individuals is higher in civil-law based countries. This can be 
explained by the lower protection offered to investors by that legal system in terms of shareholder protection. Hence, the result 
should be a consequence of a poor legal environment and under such circumstance an individual owns and manages a firm in 
order to maintain the control and to expropriate wealth from minority shareholders. From Table 3 it is also possible to observe that 
block holdings of financial vehicles are different when they are grouped by many criteria: legal environment, corruption 
perception index, disclosure level, liquidity ratio, GDP per capita, firm’s size, and market-to-book by firm. In fact, it seems that in 
poor countries with less developed capital markets, deficient legal environment and low disclosure level, where small and value 
firms are abundant, financial vehicles play an important role as blockholders. For example, in Portugal and in Turkey holding and 
private companies are very popular. Public companies are also a common blockholder in many countries, namely in Chile, 
Indonesia, Portugal, South Africa, and Turkey. This result is in line with the idea that in these countries, firms are linked among 
them, and a reduced number of blockholders control a significant percentage of their economies, as would be expected in less 
developed capital markets and economies. Finally, Table 3 shows that either religion or the firm’s risk influence the weight of 
government as the blockholder does. This result is highly influenced by the most non Catholic Asian countries, namely Hong 
Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, where the state is an important blockholder. Such is naturally a consequence of 
political orientations, namely concerning the role of the state on economy. For example, the Indian government interfere as the 
blockholder in some important industry and services areas, namely in gas distribution, electrical products, steel, financial system, 
oil refining, and in electrical utilities.  
In sum, it is difficult to conclude the existence of main criteria or variable to understand block holdings around the world. 
Law and finance and agency conflicts theory is not enough to explain corporate ownership around the world. That puzzle includes 
many other variables namely economic, cultural, and political origins. There are signs of dispersed block holdings in developed 
capital markets and rich countries where enforcement is of high quality. But it would be unfair to conclude that Denmark, Hong 
Kong, Norway, and Singapore, for example, are poor and present an inefficient enforcement. On the other hand, in spite of Italy 
and South Korea exhibiting a low quality in terms of enforcement their firms present a more disseminated block holding structure.  
Table 4 presents a multivariate analysis, from which we intended to evaluate the determinants of block holdings, 
considering mean block holdings by country as the dependent variable. It confirms prior predictions. Countries where firms are 
larger present lower block holdings. In fact, restrictions of wealth impede blockholders of having large stakes in firms. However, 
in spite of not even variables related to quality of enforcement, as rule of law and corruption perception index, present statistical 
significant as determinants of block holdings by country, there are some signs that they have certain influence on such variable. In 
fact, when we do not simultaneously consider both variables, because they are highly correlated and are a proxy of quality of 
enforcement, either rule of law or corruption perception index influence the percentage of block holdings by country. The higher 
the standards of rule of law and corruption perception index are, the lower the block holdings a country presents will be. There are 
also some signs that the state of development of a country, measured by GDP per capita, as well as a country’s market-to-book 
influences the block holdings by country. Both variables negatively influence block holdings, in line with prior results. 
Neverthless, a firm’s market capitalisation is the determinant of block holdings whose statistical significance is always relevant.            
 
4. Conclusion 
The main objective of this research paper is to evaluate how corporate control is performed in the largest firms of 32 countries 
with different country and firm-level characteristics.  
As expected there is a small number of countries like Australia, the UK, and the US, where corporate ownership is widely 
diffused. The results obtained in this research paper point out that blockholders with more than 5% of voting rights of the largest 
firms around the world, on mean by country, own about 40% of firms’ voting rights. Although the ownership concentration is 
evident in most countries it also reveals the individuality of each country. In fact, in Chile, Switzerland and Turkey individuals or 
families play an important role as shareholder; in some Asian countries, namely in Hong Kong, India, Indonesia and Thailand, the 
state is one of the most important blockholders; in Portugal financial vehicles as holding and private companies play that role; in 
Singapore, South Africa and Sweden financial institutions are the most popular shareholder, reflecting a particularity of each 
country, and not a development of a financial system - Temasek Holding, a Singaporean investment advisor owned by the 
government, Public Investment Commissioners, the government employees’ pension fund of South Africa, and Investor AB, a 
Swedish investment advisor controlled by the Wallemberg family, have very important stakes in many large local firms, but such 
does not mean that the local financial system is developed.  
In spite of difficulties related with the sample’s size and with a country’s individuality, there are some signs that the 
quality of enforcement measured either by rule of law or by corruption perception index, influences the corporate block holdings 
around the world. The higher the standards of such variables are, the lower the percentage of block holdings a firm presents. The 
same behaviour can be attributed to economic development, measured by GDP per capita. However, it must be stated that the 
impact of wealth restriction on block holdings is much more definitive than that observed by the three variables. 
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Table 1: Block Holdings by Country  
This table reports the percentage of block holdings of the twenty largest firms by country, considering 20% threshold. Shareholders with more than 5% of direct votes are included in the sample. % of country market 
capitalisation is the relationship between the market capitalisation of the largest twenty firms¸ obtained in Worldscope, and total market capitalisation (Datastream country indexes are used as country market 
capitalisation). Min (max and median) block is the country-level minimum (maximum and median) percentage of ownership, considering all stakes in 5% of issued shares. Block holdings are only considered if the 
threshold is exceeded. Mean block holdings are calculated considering all firms from a country. Mean % of block holding by type of shareholder is calculated following the definitions described in section 2.2 
 % of Country Median Block Min Block Max Block Mean Block Financial Individuals Financial Government 
Country Market Cap    by Firm Institution  Vehicle  
Australia 68.2 7.2 5.4 50.2 9.9 3.8 0.0 3.6 2.5 
Austria 84.9 11.2 5.0 93.8 50.9 11.7 4.0 23.8 11.3 
Belgium 86.4 17.3 5.5 62.8 43.1 2.1 6.9 30.7 3.3 
Canada 46.3 67.9 5.0 78.0 21.7 4.0 6.8 10.9 0.0 
Chile 75.2 19.6 5.0 83.9 63.3 10.2 21.6 29.7 1.7 
Denmark 85.9 16.3 5.0 79.5 44.9 9.7 9.5 23.6 2.0 
Finland 87.4 10.1 5.0 90.1 35.2 7.5 9.6 6.1 11.9 
France 59.8 22.6 5.0 87.3 21.5 0.0 0.0 10.5 11.0 
Germany 61.2 17.7 5.8 99.1 23.6 3.0 6.8 9.0 4.9 
Greece 84.6 26.2 5.0 64.1 34.3 1.9 7.2 15.9 9.3 
Hong Kong 72.1 30.0 5.0 84.6 56.9 5.7 10.6 18.6 22.0 
India 46.3 15.6 5.1 89.5 45.8 4.9 4.1 14.0 22.8 
Indonesia 81.4 50.5 5.1 99.1 62.9 3.7 4.3 34.9 20.1 
Ireland 90.1 9.0 5.0 47.3 26.1 14.4 3.9 5.4 2.4 
Italy 67.2 10.2 5.0 86.5 40.7 15.6 8.5 14.5 2.1 
Japan 19.8 33.6 5.5 56.8 17.7 2.7 0.0 8.3 6.7 
Malaysia 62.9 14.8 5.2 64.6 57.6 17.7 9.1 15.2 15.6 
Netherlands 77.4 7.8 5.1 87.4 19.3 7.6 7.3 4.1 0.4 
New Zealand 78.0 12.7 5.0 83.5 48.4 12.7 5.4 22.5 7.9 
Norway 85.7 16.6 5.0 79.7 47.2 6.4 13.7 12.3 14.8 
Portugal 96.0 12.5 5.0 75.6 61.7 8.6 9.6 41.0 2.6 
Singapore 68.9 15.2 5.0 82.3 41.1 29.9 3.8 7.4 0.0 
South Africa 55.5 12.7 5.3 74.5 38.1 18.8 0.7 15.6 3.0 
South Korea 62.7 8.7 5.0 78.0 38.2 6.5 1.8 18.8 11.1 
Spain 76.6 19.7 5.0 88.6 38.4 5.8 6.9 25.2 0.5 
Sweden 79.9 13.5 5.0 77.9 35.4 17.2 8.4 7.0 2.8 
Switzerland 76.6 23.3 5.1 69.3 34.4 3.4 18.1 6.3 6.5 
Taiwan 66.9 13.5 5.1 57.4 22.4 3.1 3.4 11.5 4.3 
Thailand 78.3 31.5 6.0 98.5 39.6 7.3 1.8 9.6 21.0 
Turkey 73.5 24.6 5.0 93.3 67.9 13.1 15.0 36.6 3.2 
UK 64.5 17.6 5.6 33.1 7.3 4.9 0.0 2.4 0.0 
USA 25.5 26.9 10.6 40.7 7.2 0.0 5.1 2.0 0.0 
Mean 70.2 19.9 5.3 76.2 37.6 8.3 6.7 15.5 7.1 
Median 74.3 16.4 5.0 79.6 38.3 6.5 6.8 13.1 3.8 
Table 2 : Summary of Variables 
Anti-director rights is from La Porta et al (1998) and ranges from 0 to 6. Corruption perception index is from Transparency International (2005) and ranges from 0 to 10. Rule of law is from La Porta et al (1998) and varies from 0 to 10, with lower values for less tradition for law 
and order. Disclosure level is from Bhattacharya et al (2003), with higher value indicating more disclosure. The original source is the Center for International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR). Liquidity ratio is from World Development Indicators and is defined as volume 
traded at a local stock exchange divided by the gross domestic product (GDP) - average from 1999 to 2003. Size of mutual fund industry is from Investment Company Institute (ICI) and relates the total net assets of mutual funds with GDP in 2005. Private credit is from World 
Bank and is defined by domestic credit provided by banking sector % of GDP 2004. GDP per capita in 2005 is from International Monetary Fund (IMF). Law is a dummie variable (1=common; 0=civil). Religion is a dummie variable (1=Catholic; 0=other). The median market 
capitalisation of the 20 largest firms by country, million dollar denominated, is from Worldscope (WS Item, WC07211). The median market-to-book of the 20 largest firms by country is also Worldscope. Market-to-book is defined as total assets (Worldscope Item, WC 02999) 
minus book equity - defined as total assets minus total liabilities (WC 03351) and preferred stock (WC 03451) plus deferred taxes (WC 03263) and convertible debt (WC 18282) - plus market capitalisation (WC 08001), local currency denominated, divided by total assets. The 
median annualised volatility of the 20 largest firms by country is calculated using Datastream data, dollar denominated, considering weekly returns during 2000-2005. 
Panel A: Country-Level Variables 
Country Anti-Director Corruption Rule of  Disclosure Liquidity Size of Mutual Private GDP Law Religion 
 Rights Perc. Index Law  Level Ratio Fund Industry Credit per Cap.   
Australia 4 8.8 10.0  80 0.97 1.10 1.00 30.897 Common Other 
Austria 2 8.7 10.0  62 0.16 0.37 1.23 33.432 Civil Catholic 
Belgium 0 7.4 10.0  68 0.71 0.33 1.12 31.244 Civil Catholic 
Canada 5 8.4 10.0  75 1.02 0.50 0.97 34.273 Common Catholic 
Chile 5 7.3 7.02  78 0.83 0.15 0.70 11.937 Civil Catholic 
Denmark 2 9.5 10.0  75 0.58 0.31 1.66 34.740 Civil Other 
Finland 3 9.6 10.0  83 1.78 0.24 0.70 31.208 Civil Other 
France 3 7.5 8.98  78 0.88 0.67 1.07 29.187 Civil Catholic 
Germany 1 8.2 9.23  67 0.56 0.71 1.43 30.579 Civil Other 
Greece 2 4.3 6.18  61 0.80 0.16 1.05 22.392 Civil Other 
Hong Kong 5 8.3 8.22  73 3.39 2.83 1.49 33.479 Common Other 
India 5 2.9 4.17  61 0.30 0.06 0.60 3.320 Common Other 
Indonesia 2 2.2 3.98  NA 0.23 NA 0.71 4.459 Civil Other 
Ireland 4 7.4 7.80  81 0.67 3.01 1.18 40.610 Common Catholic 
Italy 1 5.0 8.33  66 0.53 0.27 1.05 28.534 Civil Catholic 
Japan 4 7.3 8.98  71 0.68 0.10 1.55 30.615 Civil Other 
Malaysia 4 5.1 6.78  79 1.41 NA 1.34 11.201 Common Other 
Netherlands 2 8.6 10.0  74 1.36 0.16 1.67 30.862 Civil Catholic 
New Zealand 4 9.6 10.0  NA 0.40 0.10 1.21 24.797 Common Other 
Norway 4 8.9 10.0  75 0.37 0.16 0.11 42.364 Civil Other 
Portugal 3 6.5 8.68  NA 0.47 0.17 1.51 19.335 Civil Catholic 
Singapore 4 9.4 8.57  79 1.59 NA 0.80 28.368 Common Other 
South Africa 5 4.5 4.42  79 1.54 0.31 0.85 12.161 Common Other 
South Korea 2 5.0 5.35  68 0.48 0.29 1.01 20.590 Civil Other 
Spain 4 7.0 7.80  72 0.76 0.30 1.39 26.320 Civil Catholic 
Sweden 3 9.2 10.0  83 1.14 0.34 1.13 29.926 Civil Other 
Switzerland 2 9.1 10.0  80 2.52 0.33 1.75 32.571 Civil Catholic 
Taiwan 3 5.9 8.52  58 1.02 0.19 1.67 27.721 Civil Other 
Thailand 2 3.8 6.25  66 0.38 NA 1.05 8.368 Common Other 
Turkey 2 3.5 5.18  58 0.33 0.07 0.60 7.950 Civil Other 
UK 5 8.6 8.57  85 1.59 0.26 1.58 30.436 Common Other 
USA 5 7.6 10.0  76 1.42 0.76 2.71 41.399 Common Other 
Mean 3.2 7.0 8.22  72.8 0.97 0.51 1.18 25.790   
Median 3.0 7.5 8.63  75 0.78 0.30 1.13 29.557   
                                                 
                                               Panel B: Firm-Level Variables 
Country 
Market 
Capitalisation 
Market-
to-Book Volatility 
 (median) (median) (median) 
Australia 15.219 1.41 0.22 
Austria 4.077 1.23 0.27 
Belgium 6.896 1.34 0.25 
Canada 28.917 1.35 0.24 
Chile 2.763 1.24 0.27 
Denmark 4.014 1.51 0.29 
Finland 4.067 1.50 0.31 
France 47.826 1.19 0.29 
Germany 32.799 1.07 0.34 
Greece 4.483 1.38 0.30 
Hong Kong 13.974 1.14 0.30 
India 10.914 1.72 0.41 
Indonesia 2.242 1.52 0.49 
Ireland 2.979 1.57 0.27 
Italy 17.247 1.13 0.28 
Japan 49.882 1.11 0.34 
Malaysia 4.206 1.22 0.20 
Netherlands 14.195 1.39 0.34 
New Zealand 1.084 1.49 0.26 
Norway 3.125 1.51 0.35 
Portugal 2.360 1.18 0.26 
Singapore 4.108 1.15 0.28 
South Africa 10.106 1.56 0.35 
South Korea 12.919 1.20 0.46 
Spain 16.121 1.31 0.23 
Sweden 13.464 1.36 0.30 
Switzerland 16.367 1.74 0.32 
Taiwan 9.321 1.41 0.35 
Thailand 2.814 1.24 0.36 
Turkey 2.919 1.23 0.56 
UK 71.490 1.62 0.26 
USA 155.476 1.93 0.27 
Mean 18.387 1.37 0.31 
Median 9.714 1.36 0.29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 3 - Univariate Analysis by Category of Blockholder 
The table reports means block holdings (in percentages) and t-statistics based on the 20% percent threshold, for a sample of the largest firms 
by country. All block holdings (qualified participations) representing more than 5% of voting rights are included on the sample. When a sum 
of qualified participations is lower than 20%, a firm is considered as having a 100% free float. Means for countries are grouped according to 
the following criteria: Legal environment; Anti-director rights; Corruption perception index; Rule of law; Disclosure level; Religion; 
Liquidity ratio; Private credit; GDP per capita; Size of mutual fund industry; Market capitalisation by firm (country median); Market-to-book 
(country median); Volatility by firm (country median). *, **, and ***, indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%. N is the number 
of countries. 
 N All Financial Individuals Financial Government 
   Institution   Vehicle  
Means       
Common 12 33.3 10.4 4.3 10.6 8.1 
Civil 20 40.1 7.0 8.1 18.5 6.5 
t – statistic (-1.08) (1.24) (-2.42)** (-2.47)** (0.53) 
High Anti-director rights 15 35.1 9.5 6.1 12.9 6.7 
Low Anti-director rights 17 39.8 7.2 7.2 17.9 7.5 
t – statistic (-0.77) (0.97) (-0.57) (-1.39) (-0.33) 
High Corruption Perc. Index 16 31.6 8.0 6.8 10.6 6.1 
Low Corruption Perc. Index 16 43.6 8.5 6.6 20.4 8.1 
t – statistic (-2.17)** (-0.24) (0.15) (-2.93)** (-0.78) 
High Rule of Law 16 32.6 6.3 7.0 13.8 5.5 
Low Rule of Law 16 42.5 10.2 6.4 17.2 8.7 
t – statistic (-1.74)* (-1.76)* (0.29) (-0.90) (-1.27) 
High Disclosure Level 15 32.7 9.9 7.4 10.5 5.0 
Low Disclosure Level 14 38.5 6.5 6.0 17.2 8.8 
t – statistic (-0.98) (1.39) (0.67) (-2.09)** (-1.49) 
Catholic 11 38.3 7.6 8.5 18.4 3.8 
Others 21 37.2 8.6 5.7 14.0 8.9 
t – statistic (0.17) (-0.46) (1.32) (1.02) (-2.42)** 
High Liquidity Ratio 16 31.6 8.5 7.0 10.4 5.7 
Low Liquidity Ratio 16 43.6 8.0 6.4 20.6 8.5 
t – statistic (-2.15)** (0.20) (0.32) (-3.09)*** (-1.14) 
High Size of Mutual Fund Ind. 14 32.3 7.1 6.3 13.7 5.2 
Low Size of Mutual Fund Ind. 14 39.2 7.6 7.7 17 7.1 
t – statistic (-1.12) (-0.22) (-0.67) (-0.81) (-0.81) 
High Private Credit 16 34.5 8.0 6.8 14.1 5.6 
Low Private Credit 16 40.7 8.5 6.6 16.9 8.6 
t – statistic (-1.05) (-0.20) (0.09) (-0.75) (-1.21) 
Large GDP per Capita 16 30.0 6.5 6.9 10.9 5.7 
Small GDP per Capita 16 45.1 10.0 6.4 20.2 8.5 
t – statistic (-2.84)*** (-1.53) (0.26) (-2.75)*** (-1.12) 
High Market Capitalisation 16 28.5 6.5 5.3 10.7 6.0 
Low Market Capitalisation 16 46.7 10.0 8.0 20.4 8.2 
t – statistic (-3.65)*** (-1.55) (-1.51) (-2.90)*** (-0.87) 
High Market-to-Book 16 32.4 7.5 6.3 11.7 6.9 
Low Market-to-Book 16 42.7 9.0 7.1 19.4 7.3 
t – statistic (-1.82)* (-0.64) (-0.42) (-2.18)** (-0.16) 
High Volatility 16 38.7 7.1 7.0 14.3 10.3 
Low Volatility 16 36.5 9.5 6.3 16.8 3.9 
t – statistic (0.37) (-1.04) (0.38) (-0.67) (2.82)*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 4 - Multivariate Analysis of Cross-Country Variations on Block Holdings 
The table reports the results of OLS regressions for a sample of 32 countries, considering 20% threshold. The dependent variable 
is mean block holding by country.  Independent variables are defined in Table 2. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are 
reported in parentheses.  
 
Law -5.072 -4.389 -2.875 -3.995    
 (-1.09) (-0.92) (-0.57) (-0.81) 
 
 
Corruption Perc. Index 1.950 0.803 -1.802   -1.726  
 (0.98) (0.40) (-2.32) **  
 
(-2.19) **  
Rule of Law -1.774 -3.346  -2.511   -2.161 
 (-0.73) (-1.54)  (-3.40) *** 
 
 
(-2.88) 
*** 
Religion 3.290 2.908 1.558 2.694    
 (0.90) (0.64) (0.38) (0.63) 
 
  
GDP per Capita -10.563    -8.359   
 (-1.89) *    (-3.44) ***   
Market Capitalisation -8.067 -9.177 -9.780 -9.282 -8.684 -9.829 -9.456 
 (-5.23) *** (-6.50) *** (-7.75) *** (-7.03) *** (-6.64) *** (-7.94) *** 
(-7.16) 
*** 
Market-to-Book -14.282 -12.054 -12.559 -12.109 -17.590 -15.040 
-
15.680 
 (-1.24)  (-1.10)  (-1.16)  (-1.13) (-2.05) ** (-1.78) * (-1.79) * 
Adj. R2 0.64 0.60 0.59 0.61 0.65 0.61 0.62 
N 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
 
 
